Orbital Watch to Enable Sharing of Classified Threat Information

In today’s congested and contested space environment, commercial space companies must now prepare for a variety of threats that can compromise their systems on-orbit: from incidental collisions with space debris, to counterspace threats like cyber and electronic warfare attacks, as well as kinetic strikes. Meanwhile, the inherently dual-use nature of space systems, which often support both national security and economic purposes, further reinforces the imperative that the United States Space Force communicates threat information with its industry partners to ensure resiliency of our nation’s space capabilities. 

Now, a new Space Force program, Orbital Watch, aims to do just that: facilitate greater information-sharing with industry partners for both unclassified and classified threats.

In this episode of “The Elara Edge,” Col (Ret) Charlie McGillis explains how Orbital Watch, within the broader Space Force Front Door program, aims to enable better threat information-sharing with industry partners. Prior to becoming a partner with Elara Nova, Charlie served as the former Director of Intelligence at 14th Air Force (Space) and is a former senior vice president at Slingshot Aerospace. Today, she is an active member of the independent review board for the Office of Space Commerce’s Traffic Coordination System for Space (TraCSS).

"The Elara Edge" is hosted by Scott King and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. The full story can be found on Elara Nova's Insights page here. Music was produced by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio.

Transcript

Host: Scott King 

SME: Charlie McGillis, Elara Nova partner, former Director of Intelligence at 14th Air Force (Space); former Senior Vice President at Slingshot Aerospace; TraCSS Independent Review Board member 

00:02 - 01:27 

In today’s congested and contested space environment, commercial space companies must now prepare for a variety of threats that can compromise their systems on-orbit: from incidental collisions with space debris, to counterspace threats like cyber and electronic warfare attacks, as well as kinetic strikes. 

Meanwhile, the inherently dual-use nature of space systems, which often support both national security and economic purposes, further reinforces the imperative that the United States Space Force communicates threat information with its industry partners to ensure resiliency of our nation’s space capabilities. Now, a new Space Force program, Orbital Watch, aims to do just that: facilitate greater information-sharing with industry partners for both unclassified and classified threats.  

Welcome to the Elara Edge! Returning to the show today is retired Colonel Charlie McGillis. As the former Director of Intelligence at 14th Air Force (Space), Charlie provided tailored, responsive, local, and global space effects in support of national and Combatant Commander objectives. She is also the former senior vice president at Slingshot Aerospace and is a currently serving member of the independent review board for the Traffic Coordination System for Space (or TraCSS) which we’ve previously discussed on the show. 

Ma’am, welcome back!

01:28 - 01:29 

Thank you. It's great to be here with you. 

01:30 - 01:43 

Thanks for making time to join us again today. 

Now, Space Systems Command first announced the Orbital Watch program in April of this year. So let’s start there: what is Orbital Watch? And what problem is it aiming to solve? 

01:44 - 04:11 

Let's start with the problem first, because I think that's really important. But there are threats to the US national security interests that are actually happening in space today. Those actions are being taken by our adversaries, and that can impact space operations. And it doesn't matter whether you're a military, civil or commercial spacecraft. So that's the problem that they're trying to solve.  

SSC Front Door, which now is the U.S Space Force Front Door, began an initiative to communicate unclassified threat information to commercial vendors to help them make decisions on risk management. 

They've announced two specific phases and so first a vendor has to register with the Front Door and you can share an idea, product or service and so basically the Front Door is using this what I would call a Rolodex of ‘Who do I need to talk to? And potentially who do I need to buy capabilities from?’ 

For Orbital Watch, it only requires a basic registration. Sending in this information. The company doesn't have to do any kind of training and no specific information controls are needed. This first phase is just a distribution. A one way. They're going to send information out to the vendors that have registered with the Front Door and so they disseminate an unclassified threat fact sheet prepared by Headquarters Space Force Intelligence to over 900 companies because they are operating in this domain with all the other space operators and they could be impacted by this threat.  

But it is important to note: it doesn't give the vendors an opportunity to ask questions like they see something in the threat assessment and they go, ‘Oh, well, I'd like to know more about that?’ There's no opportunity to do that. So it's really just a one-way direction. 

In phase two, what they've announced is that they will actually introduce a secure Commercial Portal that will enable that two-way information flow of sharing. If that commercial satellite got an indication something happened to them, they could actually share that information then with the Space Force. I also believe that in this two-way portal, the Space Force could share information with these operators if they saw something.  

So I think it's significant to have a two-way portal so that the commercial company can ask questions. It's not just a one-way street. So the commercial company may be the one that first detects that threat, they can actually give that information to the military and it could be disseminated more broadly. So that's why the two-way portal is certainly significant.

04:12 - 04:17 

And so why is it important for Orbital Watch to be rolled out in this kind of phased and iterative approach? 

04:18 - 06:21 

I think it's important one: because they need to share the information with the space operators that are out there. They're the clearinghouse. They are the ones that are getting all the companies coming in and registering with them so they kind of have the rolodex. But it's also important in this phased approach, because they are going to have to figure out how to share the classified information, and that's going to take time. It's not insurmountable, but it's also complicated. 

First of all, let's talk about what does it take for a company to get a security clearance or an individual like myself. So that company actually has to get a facility clearance level to even get individuals cleared. 

My understanding when the incident happened with Viasat, when they experienced this jamming, the Space Force deemed, ‘Hey, there's some other operators around that probably should know that information.’ So they were actually able to do what we call a one-time read on of classified information to inform those other space operators that, ‘Hey, there is this threat, you need to be aware of it.’ So you can do that, but it's not normal.  

The next phase would be to set up a cadence of that dissemination that matches almost in near real-time or close to it. There was a threat. You may have not much time in order to respond to it, and so they need to be able to get that information out quickly.  

But it's also important to note that not all vendors can process or store that classified information, even at CUI data - controlled unclassified information - you need to be able to have special permissions and so what's not clear to me is how the Space Force is going to enable this for commercial space operators who don't actually have an existing contract or what we call a DD254. It's a form that says, ‘Hey, you're on contract with the Space Force. You now, because of the contract and the work that you're doing, you need access to classified information.’ 

If you don't have that, I'm not sure how the government is going to go through sponsoring these companies to have access to classified information.

06:21 - 06:33 

Can you share how threats in space have evolved over time and why better information-sharing, particularly at the classified level, is required to both prepare for and respond to these evolving threats?  

06:34 – 10:02 

So really, over that last ten years or so, we've really seen China rapidly field space and counterspace capabilities. ISR. So intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance satellites, Satcom - how you communicate? Also large constellations. And we've really witnessed more advanced maneuvering and the willingness to expend fuel to conduct rapid maneuvers demonstrating tactics, techniques and procedures that could be used for space warfighting.  

Some examples: China maneuvered two satellites, the Sinjan-21 and the Sinjan-25, into extremely close proximity, where they conducted a probable satellite refueling experiment in GEO. And then also there's a series of satellites called the TJS series of experimental satellites that analysts believe carry out classified missions including signals intelligence, early warning missions and satellite inspection activities to support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Now some TJS satellites have demonstrated the ability to maneuver in orbit and inspect or approach other satellites, potentially for surveillance, interference and counterspace operations. 

And we saw this back in 2018 when TJS-3 maneuvered close to a US ISR satellite.   Now, some may say, ‘Well, those could be commercial use as well.’ That is true. But they can also be modified to serve a counterspace purpose. 

So especially for RPOs, if you do a rendezvous in proximity op, you could be doing it to refuel. You could be doing it to actually look at the satellite. Is there something wrong with it? If I have an anomaly with a satellite. But you could also be looking at it. What is that satellite? Taking pictures of that satellite from on orbit. Or maybe you're listening - it’s a SIGINT kind of capability. So just being close to another satellite, you can kind of use it for military purposes.  

And the other piece besides these large maneuvers, increase in satellites on orbit. There has been widespread jamming and spoofing of GPS signals in and around specifically conflict zones. So think about Ukraine. We've seen this explicitly with Russia, but also in the Middle East.  

Commercial satellites are being targeted, and in fact, in many cases, the commercial satellite could know something is happening before the military. They could actually be the indications and warning. 

The other one is we know in unclassified sources and threat assessments that are out there that Russia and China have a laser capability. So they could actually lase a imaging satellite, and that satellite would know that that is happening as well. That would be another indicator that something is happening in the space domain.  

And so Russia's been very vocal about this and about its intention to consider commercial assets used by the U.S. military as legitimate targets because of this.  

This is why it's so important to understand the behaviors that these satellites are doing and is it showing intent to do harm, or is it really just for a commercial use? And so you really have to watch that pattern of behavior and what are those satellites actually doing on orbit? 

This is why it is so important to share this information not only at the non-classified level, but also the classified level to commercial operators, especially those that are in service to the US government for military purposes as it may impact their space operations. 

10:03 – 10:14 

I’d like to go back to an example you brought up with the 2022 cyberattack on ViaSat. Can you expand about how that attack offers something of an example of how a program like Orbital Watch would work?  

10:15 – 11:26 

Yes to be more specific, on the Viasat example that happened at the beginning of Russia invading Ukraine, the Viasat satellite experienced that cyberattack that you mentioned. They are part of the Commercial Integration Cell and so I'm sure that they shared this information with the CSpoC the Combined Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Space Force Base, who has the responsibility to execute operational command and control (C2) of space forces to achieve both theater and global objectives. 

And so this is a good example because when Viasat experienced this, it was kind of like an indication warning: something is happening or going to happen. CSpOC would have the responsibility to share this information with EUCOM (the actual Combatant Command responsible for supporting Ukraine. And in this case, the cyber attack was part of the Russians coordinated offense to effect Ukraine’s command and control during the invasion. Now simultaneously, the CSpOC could simultaneously tell other space operators that they can anticipate this kind of action through Orbital Watch so other space operators would know that if they experience a similar attack that it might be intentional and not incidental. 

11:27 – 11:46 

Now, Ma’am, you just reference another information-sharing effort: that being the Commercial Integration Cell. But there are other efforts as well, including the Joint Commercial Operations Cell (JCO) and the Space Warfighting and Analysis Center (Space ISAC). 

What’s the difference between Orbital Watch and some of these other information-sharing programs?

 11:47 – 15:39 

It's super important to understand the difference between these because it really depends on where you are as a commercial company and where you are participating. 

Now Orbital Watch is this basic service. It's with the Space Force that are disseminating threat information one way, today, and these are usually members that aren't part of the Commercial Integration Cell. They don't have a contract - that DD254 - with the Space Force, so it's one-way communication.  

So with the JCO. So Joint Commercial Operation cell, so that integrates commercial capabilities into the mission by supporting the protect and defend mission. When you operate through these regional cells they operate 24/7 and they're staffed globally. Allies participate in it. But the JCO leverages this commercial data in the sensors and analytical services to provide timely, non-classified space domain awareness. 

And what they do is if they see things on orbit then they alert via what we call NOTSO or Notice to Space Operators for high-inter space activity such as these satellite maneuvers we talked about - or space launch. But if you're part of the JCO this requires training. They have a very specific methodology. You have to onboard with the JCO and you have to do this training. So that's one. 

The other one is the Commercial Integration Cell and you have to be invited to participate in this and I was part of this organization almost nearly at the beginning. And it actually started with what we call a CRADA. So a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement and so these CRADAs - it's no money exchanged. 

It's just an agreement between a company and the Space Force that allows sharing of information and it allowed them to sponsor companies to have access to classified information. Now it's kind of progressed and so these companies do have DD254s and they can get information.They practice at exercises. They come and participate. They have a person that sits on the floor at the CSpoC that provides cooperative information sharing, but it also requires training. 

And they do contribute to military planning and to the Combatant Commands that are around. So that's the CIC. You have to be invited. You do training. You can share classified information.  

And then last but not least is the Space ISAC. This is a ‘pay-to-play.’ If you're a company and you want to share information, you can pay to be a member of the Space ISAC. 

Now they distribute those NOTSOs I talked about from the JCO, which adds more information sharing and concerns about everything that's happening in the space operational environment. But the Space ISAC also focuses on cyber monitoring. They actually aggregate inputs. They have a 24/7 ops center, and if a commercial operator experiences something, they can report it to the Space ISAC ops center. Then Space-ISAC actually works within the intelligence community, reports it up, and they will try to then disseminate that information to other operators. 

They do have to be careful because sometimes there's proprietary information in there and so they do have to kind of what I call ‘whitewash’ it, the information - so you don't know. But that’s the role of the Space-ISAC. 

So first of all, you know, we'll kind of go back: phase one Orbital Watch: just pushing information out at a non-classified level. JCO you have to have training. It is for space domain awareness specifically what is what's happening in orbit? 

CIC. You have to be invited to it and you have to be able to have access and do classified information and then Space ISAC - pay to play. You can pay to play to be a member of that organization.

15:40 - 15:52 

To take that a step further - what factors should Space Force leadership consider to make sure that they’re not duplicating these information-sharing programs, but rather reinforcing collaboration between the service and its commercial partners? 

15:53 – 18:30 

So remember, the goal of these data-sharing efforts is to provide a more secure, resilient space infrastructure. So even though the government can't tell them what to do, the more information you share - people are going to do things that make sense and that are in their interest. They don't want to collide with the satellite. They don't want to have a threat and so sharing that information allows them to respond to those evolving threats. 

Some would say there needs to be clear lanes in the road on what each of these efforts should share. But in reality, in Charlie's opinion, the Space Force can't overshare. They can't, especially at the not classified level. Their biggest challenge has been and is removing the classification barriers. Space is still over-classified and some movement has been made, but I would say not enough. As we grow these commercial capabilities, there's very little places to hide in space.  

I mean, we talked about the JCO. It's all commercial capability that can look up, have space domain awareness, and so everybody can see it. We need to emphasize that this coordination needs to happen and needs to be integrated among the government, commercial and Allied partners to remove the unnecessary classification barriers.  

I did hear recently the same comment at the AFA conference. There was an international panel and we need to remove some of these barriers to be able to share information not just with our commercial partners, but with our Allied partners as well. 

And the other thing I like to bring up here is: this is a great effort by the Space Force, but there's always been other organizations for many years that have been sharing what's going on in the space operational environment.  

CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies, CASI, China Aerospace Studies Institute, ISR Integrity puts out a I think it's bi weekly something they call Integrity Flash. You can go look it up and get on their website and get specific information about what's going on in the space environment from a threat perspective.  

DIA Space Threat Assessment, the Secure World Foundation does a Global Counterspace Capabilities Report, and DNI actually does an annual threat assessment as well that includes space. So there's a lot of information out there already at the unclassified level. 

But it does take expertise to be able to read the information and understand what's going on. This effort with the Space Force, with Orbital Watch, is trying to get it to a place where everybody can understand really what's going on in the space environment.

18:31 – 18:41 

Now with that in mind, what are some of the current challenges that need to be overcome or other risks to be considered when it comes to implementing a program like Orbital Watch, effectively? 

18:42 – 21:21 

Yes. So this is not a small endeavor. We kind of talked about. This is going to be a huge undertaking by the Space Force in order to do this. So first they need to establish how to give a commercial partner access that doesn't require them to have a contract.  

Now, let's step back for a minute. So with sharing classified information is not easy. You have to be on a secure line. You have to be in a specific place. You have to have the need to know and you have to have those clearances. 

This is, in my opinion, going to be key: who are they going to share this information with and who can they get that done?  

So recently there was actually a DARPA program called BRIDGES, and they provided 19 companies clearances without having that contract and very successful, it was launched to solve the dilemma of why can we not share information with these companies?  

And it gave them that clearance so that they could then continue to produce the technology that they were doing and understand the ‘why’ behind it. What capability is it going to bring to the warfighter? It did identify that this program is a great start to what the Space Force needs to do.  

They're actually working with the Commercial Space Office (COMSO) to expand this, but my concern is scalability. How are they going to be able to scale this? They talked about 900 vendors for sending out this information. How are you going to rack and stack who gets first and who's last?  

So we talked about how getting the clearances is one thing, but actually having the facility to share that information is also important. So they do that normally in these facilities, especially at the higher classification levels in a place called a SCIF. Not every company is going to have the money to build their own SCIF and so you need a way to be able to share that information [and] have it accessible. And what I will say on that is there are companies that because they saw this as a pain point, companies don't have the money in order to invest in this. 

So they've actually started basically where you can buy space, rent space at a SCIF for your company. So you don't actually have to do that huge investment that will be helpful and the Space Force should consider this. Maybe it's a way to share that information in a better way. So think about if you have a portal, you're able to walk into a secure facility and actually log on and get this information. 

And maybe there's a person on the other end that, Hey, you have a little chat and you can go, Hey, I have some information, or I want to be able to ask you a question about something that was shared, but you got to have those facilities in order to be able to do that to make sure the information is secure.

21:22 – 21:45 

On this concern for the scalability issue: you mentioned that there’s already 900 vendors receiving unclassified information in phase one of Orbital Watch. 

At the same time, we’re continuing to see unprecedented growth in a space economy that is further projected to reach $1.8 trillion by 2035 - so can you elaborate on this challenge within the context of the growing commercial space economy today? 

21:46 – 22:47 

Yeah, the commercial space economy is booming. We're seeing new entrants every day, and it's just crazy to me the amount of innovation and people that want to be involved in space. 

And you're seeing that continually climb. And so when I talk about that 900 number, that's what the Front Door said, that they sent out to 900 vendors this unclassified threat assessment and so being able to scale that - now, let's say all 900 don't have to be U.S. companies either. There could be Allied companies in there that are also interested in providing those capabilities. 

But to be able to scale that and provide those clearances, they're going to have to decide quickly which capabilities do I want to continue to have this innovation and continue to build? They're probably going to be the first ones: being able to scale this at a large number like 900. It's going to be tough, and there's going to be some, in Charlie's terms, ‘haves and have nots.’ 

22:48 - 22:52 

And going back to the Front Door program - why is it appropriate for Orbital Watch to be part of that effort? 

22:53 – 24:23 

So the Front Door program, it really allows commercial companies. It's a one stop shop. If you want to do business with the Space Force and you're a company and you have an innovative idea, it's really important for space startup companies to be able to come in and go, ‘Hey, I have this neat, innovative idea. I want to tell you about it and how it can help you.’  

And so it gives them a method, a way to be able to register with the Space Force. And then the Front Door actually takes that information. They read it and they take the ones that they think really could apply those capabilities and help the Space Force. 

And they basically go and share this information with the PEOs. The PEOs are trying to build the programs and get the capabilities to the warfighter as quickly as they can and the Front Door is used as that one stop shop. That clearinghouse.  

So I think it's because they do have this capability to basically have the rolodex and the clearinghouse for industry and make sure that then they are connected and I know a lot of the PEOs take briefings from some of these companies and go, ‘Yes, this is how I can use it.’  

Now, what I will say is, I also know that there are companies that don't have those clearances, and they are developing capabilities that could help on the classified side. So that's why I think this program is so important to get to that classified level, because they will now be able to share that information and have those more meaningful conversations.  

24:24 – 24:43 

We’ve also seen a series of strategy documents get released during the tenure of General B. Chance Saltzman - the Space Force’s Chief of Space Operations. Namely, the DOD Commercial Space Integration Strategy and the Space Force's Commercial Space Strategy. 

In what ways does the Orbital Watch program align with these strategy documents? 

24:44 – 26:31 

Orbital Watch aligns with both of those documents. I've heard General Saltzman say in his remarks at AMOS and also in his remarks at the AFA conference recently, that he can't do it without those partnerships. In the DoD strategy, it actually outlined department wide guidance on policy and procedures, whereas in the Space Force one, it really focused on the service specific use cases, and it needs to foster that effective collaboration and integration between government and industry.  

By sharing the unclassified threat information - it allows these commercial partners to build and operate secure, resilient space systems that are integrated into these national security architectures.  

So let's be clear. There are commercial space satellites that are used by our military today and so fostering this rapid response will ensure that the warfighters have what they need based on the threats that we're seeing.  

I also believe that it's really about situational awareness. Industry needs to understand what is going on in the space environment if they are going to support government, US and our Allies, and it is making sure that the commercial providers become active players in our national defense.  

And it is about two-way sharing. We talked about commercial maybe being that first line of defense. They're going to get the indications and warning that something's happening and so they need to be able to have a mechanism to be able to share that information. And so I really believe Orbital Watch operationalizes the policies and objectives found in these strategies. And it creates a platform for real-time risk awareness and being able to share secure information and it also sets the new standards for commercial integration in the National Space Security Strategy.

26:32 - 26:42 

And say the Space Force implements both phases of the Orbital Watch program effectively - what advantages will this ultimately bring to the Space Force and its industry partners?  

26:43 - 28:53 

I see four advantages. The first one is enhanced national security and space advantage. 

General Saltzman talked about that sustained partnership that he needs with industry is crucial for that US to maintain its edge in space, but it's also essential for both national security and how you and I actually live on Earth today. That's how we get access. It’s how we go to the bank teller. It's how we get gas in our car and so space isn't just there for a warfighting perspective. It's also there to support us here on Earth every day and so super important for space operators. They need to be able to operate freely and provide those services.  

But the US has to also know that the threat is increased - if the need arises. They need to be able to take action where needed and we are seeing that increase, as we already talked about, right, with China and accelerating its efforts. So that's number one.  

Two is the integration of those commercial capabilities. Commercial gets to decide whether it's going to maneuver or not based on a threat that it has, you still need to be able to share that information. 

And if you have that collaboration and now the government knows that, hey, this commercial asset is or isn't going to maneuver, they can then make better decisions based on that. So you have to be able to integrate those commercial capabilities.  

And that actually improves the third one which is operational effectiveness. So commercial partners can fill key mission gaps, especially like satellite communication, imagery and the Space Force has really moved to this model of ‘buy before you build it.’ Commercial is filling that gap and bringing those additional capabilities that they need.  

And then lastly is clear role distinction. So government will retain control over inherently government missions such as defensive and offensive space control. But where they can include commercial capabilities, it really alleviates the government from having to do that for their mission - being able to do those four things are kind of the advantages that I see for the Space Force today.

28:54 – 29:11 

Thank you, Ma’am. Now I’d like to take a moment and look back on the last time you joined us on The Elara Edge - when we discussed the Traffic Coordination System for Space, otherwise known as TraCSS. How might a program like TraCSS benefit from, or if at all, collaborate with something like the Orbital Watch program?  

29:12 - 31:56 

TraCCS is for civil space safety and we kind of talked about that in the earlier podcast. It just provides that positional data, making sure that space operators are safe in space, almost like air traffic control - so they don't collide. 

Now, previously I mentioned the difference between that positional data and threat information and we kind of went through that. But let's reiterate it here for those that didn't have that opportunity: positional data is where that satellite is in space. It's where it is. It doesn't tell me anything about that satellite. Like what does it do? What is its function? 

And so the threat information is going to not only include that positional data, but it's going to provide an assessment of that intent - based on the capabilities of that satellite. So in other words, why is that satellite maneuvering to a new location and why would that be a threat to a commercial satellite. So it really provides the ‘so what?’ 

So that's kind of the difference between what TraCSS - very positional [and] what Orbital Watch is trying to do with providing that so what? Now TraCSS in the future I think could ensure based on what they're doing - sharing that positional data with the Space Force. They might have other data sources actually that Space Force doesn't have because they're buying commercial data, and that could be taken into account for those threat assessments. 

And what they would inform space operators of is maybe debris-causing events. Now this could be a collision. Two satellites collided. I have to tell you about the debris that's there flying in space. It could be nothing nefarious happened. Two satellites didn't collide, but something caused some debris. And then it could be an offensive action, like, say, an ASAT missile gets launched and it actually hits a satellite, which has happened in the past. China has done it, Russia has done it. India has done it. Blown up their own satellite and it's caused debris. A lot of the debris is still up there in space. 

So those could be things that TraCSS does. But for these unclassified threat assessment, I could imagine the Office of Space Commerce kind of putting a hot button, as I would call it, right on TraCSS to help disseminate that information. But what I don't see is the Office of Space Commerce playing a role in producing these threat assessments. That's not their mission. 

Their mission, based on the SPD-3, is to really do space safety, not from a threat perspective. That's the Space Force's mission. And they provide that to make sure that space capabilities are provided to the joint force. And so I do see the joint force, like U.S. Space Command, its mission is to deter aggression, defend national interests, which could actually be commercial and civil satellites. They need to maybe defend those national interests, and when necessary, they're going to defeat those threats.

31:57 – 32:08 

And then as a partner with Elara Nova, how can the strategic advisory firm serve as a facilitator between the Space Force and industry partners seeking to participate in programs like Orbital Watch? 

32:09 - 33:30 

I believe Elara Nova can act as a critical bridge between the Space Force and the commercial partners by advocating for and enabling this improved data-sharing framework, and it considers both current operational needs and based on the historical classification challenge we have had. I see Elara Nova as a facilitator for data-sharing and understanding that collaboration.  

We can help advise companies in order to make sure that they get registered with the Space Force Front Door and what it might take to actually navigate that facility clearance and the personnel clearance requirements and we can help guide them to be responsible space operators.  

Now, as we work with maybe some new entrants to the space economy, those space operators need to realize that there is norms of behavior that need to be followed as a space operator and so we can help educate them on that.  

The other one is on policy advocacy. I know Elara Nova does a lot of this already. But we can continue to advocate and support these initiatives and really to reduce that over classification. And it's really important to do that so that we can share information not only with our Allies, right? Who we are operating [with] day in and day out, but also with our commercial partners that we're doing this with.

33:31 - 34:07 

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge. As a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space and aeronautical domains, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in national security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. This episode was edited and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge.