2024 Election Presents Promise and Peril for PPBE Reform to Deliver Space Superiority

Over the past decade, China’s rapid rise in adopting and deploying innovative technologies has sparked a new “Great Power Competition,” particularly in the space domain. According to Major General Gregory J Gagnon, the chief intelligence officer for the United States Space Force, China’s “strategic breakout” in space is evident by the country’s more than 1,000 satellites on-orbit today, and a demonstrated capacity to launch over 200 satellites each year. 

Meanwhile, the budgetary process for the Department of Defense (DOD) - known as the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution or PPBE - is increasingly unable to keep up with the rapid innovations of modern technology. That's why in the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act - or NDAA - Congress mandated a Commission on PPBE Reform to deliver guidance for modernizing the DOD’s budgetary process. 

In this episode of, “The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security,” Elara Nova partner Shawn Barnes, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Congressional Budget and Appropriations Liaison, provides insight and analysis on the Commission on PPBE Reform's Final Report and how the inevitable change in administration after the 2024 election presents both promise and peril for implementing its recommendations to deliver space superiority for the warfighter.

"The Elara Edge" is hosted by Scott King and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. The full story can be found on Elara Nova's Insights page here. Music was produced by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio.

Transcript

Host: Scott King 

SME: Shawn Barnes, Elara Nova Partner 

00:02 - 02:24 

Over the past decade, China’s rapid rise in adopting and deploying innovative technologies has sparked a new “Great Power Competition,” particularly in the space domain. According to Major General Gregory J Gagnon, the chief intelligence officer for the United States Space Force, China’s “strategic breakout” in space is evident by the country’s more than 1,000 satellites on-orbit today, and a demonstrated capacity to launch over 200 satellites each year. 

To put into context just how rapid China’s rise has been, Major General Gagnon also noted that in 2014 - China was only able to put 24 satellites on-orbit in a single year. 

Meanwhile, the budgetary process for the Department of Defense (DOD) - known as the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution or PPBE - is increasingly unable to keep up with the rapid innovations of modern technology. And in the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act - or NDAA - Congress mandated a Commission on PPBE Reform to deliver guidance for modernizing the DOD’s budgetary process. 

Last spring, the Commission on PPBE Reform issued its Final Report - with 28 recommendations across five critical areas. And now, with the 2024 election underway, the inevitable change in administration - regardless of the election’s outcome - presents both promise and peril for PPBE reform. 

Welcome to the Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security. I’m your host, Scott King. And our guest today is Elara Nova partner - Shawn Barnes, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Congressional Budget and Appropriations Liaison. In this role, Shawn successfully advocated for the Air Force and Space Force budgets for fiscal years 2023, 2024, and 2025, securing critical funding for future operations.  

Now, Shawn is here to discuss the Commission on PPBE Reform’s Final Report, and the implications for the next administration - regardless of the 2024 election outcome - to see their recommendations through and deliver space superiority to the warfighter.  

Shawn, welcome to the show! 

02:25 - 02:29 

Well, thank you very much, Scott. I really appreciate the opportunity to be able to speak with you today. 

02:29 - 02:43 

Of course, now, we hear the term “space superiority” used a lot these days. So first and foremost, I’d like to define what that is, in the context of this conversation.  

So can you describe what we mean by “space superiority?”

02:44 - 03:25 

Yep, absolutely. So, I think for the purposes of this discussion today, we ought not to focus on the doctrinal definition, which is really very mission-oriented and focused on making sure that you can provide space capability at a time and place of your choosing. 

But rather think about space superiority and having the space capabilities that provide us superior capability to both support the terrestrial warfighter as well as defeat any potential adversary and, of course, deter adversaries. So that's when I think of space superiority for the purposes of this conversation today - that's what I mean. 

03:26 - 04:07 

Thank you, Shawn. Now, the current budgeting process the DOD uses today is known as PPBE - or Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution - and it’s been in place for quite a long time. 

But last spring, the Congressionally-mandated Commission on PPBE Reform published its Final Report advocating for a new approach to the budgeting process for defense acquisition.  

I’d like to tie this into our need for space superiority - so can you describe why this commission was necessary in the first place? And in what ways might the PPBE process be restricting our budgeting process to acquire the military capabilities the DOD needs to maintain space superiority?

04:08 - 06:35 

Yep, as you said, the PPBE process, formerly known as PPBS, had been put in place by Robert McNamara back in the Kennedy administration in 1961 because, frankly, the defense budgeting lacked any sense of real discipline. And it was done, in a fairly ad hoc manner. Now, that ad hoc manner gave it flexibility, but it lacked oversight by the Hill and the Department of Defense. And so, McNamara's approach was to take what was a fairly loose system and put a significant amount of rigor and discipline into it that I think served the nation pretty well for several decades. 

At that time, however, the pace of change was relatively slow. It was critical that we tie budget to strategy and clearly the nation had in mind, strategy to be able to defeat the Soviet Union and so, to have that PPBE process was important.  

As we have moved forward, and the world has continued to change - what we find is that that pace of change is now at a point where the PPBE process, as it currently exists, no longer serves us as well as it should.  

And space is not unique in suffering the challenges that the PPBE process has today, but because the pace of change is even faster in the space domain than it is in the air and the maritime and the terrestrial domains in general, and that pace on both the adversary as well as the technology, because that pace is so much faster in space, the impact of not being able to make those changes at an appropriate pace, is even larger. 

It typically on a well-oiled PPBE process is about two years from the time that the services begin their work to the time that money is actually appropriated and often it's more like two and a half years. Well, frankly, the world changes a lot in two and a half years, and we need to be able to act more quickly. 

And so the Authorizers, in this case, the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, through the National Defense Authorization Act, put in place a Commission to look at the PPBE process and make a series of recommendations as to how that might be improved.

06:36 - 06:47 

So you described how the pace of change is accelerating, but can you put that into context with China’s advancements in space? And how does that factor into this need to re-assess our budgeting process? 

06:48 - 08:12 

Yeah, and it isn't just the pace of our adversary. It's actually the pace of technology and opportunities as well. And so there were really two - those two key factors that drove the need for this Commission. 

If you take a look at what China has been able to do over the last decade, it is truly remarkable. They have gone from being a country that was clearly following, but learning, to a country that is now, on the verge of leading in many, many different areas. Some of that is quantum computing, their air and missile systems and tremendous growth in their space capabilities. So China has gone from being a potential near-peer competitor to a pacing challenge - and I think some would argue - they are an out-pacing challenge and one that we need to take very, very seriously.  

At the same time, the pace of change in technology has also created opportunities that we need to be able to take advantage of and frankly, the United States' greatest attribute is its innovation in the private sector and so being able to take advantage of that innovation in the private sector is absolutely critical to our ability to stay in front of a pacing challenge like China.

08:13 - 08:20 

And specifically on the pace of innovation for space technologies - how does this present both an opportunity and a risk for the DOD? 

08:21 - 09:36 

So there's a couple of major things that have happened in the space industry. There's several, but a couple of, I think, very important ones. One is the cost of launch has been reduced dramatically and that's been driven by competition and that competition now allows us to be able to launch much, much, cheaper than we ever have been before. 

In addition to the cost of launch, the frequency of launch is now up at a very, very high pace and so, that part of it gives us access to space in a way that we hadn't had before. That also drives the opportunity to launch things that are less expensive and launch more frequently because that cost of launch is down. 

The other side of that is the miniaturization. We have been able to frankly, stuff more capability into a smaller box and then put it onto satellites, which now allow us to be able to do things that heretofore have had to be done on very large, very heavy, very expensive systems and so having lightweight, small capabilities, that can be networked to outperform large satellites has been a significant driver and allows that innovation across the ecosystem.

09:37 - 10:18 

Now, I’d like to transition to the Commission’s Final Report itself.  

The Commission published 28 recommendations across five critical areas. And, I’d like to go through each of these five critical areas and have you provide some perspective on what the Commission is trying to achieve. 

The first critical area described in the report was to “Improve the Alignment of Budgets to Strategy.” 

To this end, the Commission recommends replacing PPBE with what they call the Defense Resourcing System - or DRS.  

In what ways might the current PPBE process have misalignment between budget and strategy? And how would the DRS present a solution for that misalignment? 

10:19 - 14:16 

So first of all, absolutely critical that budgets align to strategy and not the other way around. And frankly, as much as we say every year that we want to have strategy-driven budgets, in the end, what very often happens is that we figure out what our strategy is after we put the whole thing together, despite all the intentions to the otherwise. 

So today PPBE stands for Planning Program Budget and Execution and what the Commission is recommending is that we simplify that a little bit and so they wanted to describe it as the Defense Resourcing System. 

And they think about it in terms of Strategy Development, Resource Allocation and Execution. So sort of a three phase as opposed to a four phase, but they make recommendations for each of those parts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of each of those three phases. 

So it kind of starts with the timing of some strategy documents: our National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy - those will continue to be foundational documents. But coming out of that then is some guidance that today we call the Defense Planning Guidance and that document, typically is not particularly impactful for the development of the budget by the services. 

It is used as a grading mechanism once the services provide their budget recommendations to OSD, but it doesn't fundamentally change the way that the services do that for a couple of reasons.  

First of all, it usually comes too late so that by the time the Defense Planning Guidance or DPG arrives on the services as a finalized document, the services are largely done with building their budget submission.  

And the second is, is the Defense Planning Guidance, frankly, does not make the kinds of hard choices that need to be made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and I think that a more rigorous discussion upfront, that includes senior leaders across the Department of Defense, not just within OSD, then leads towards a document where those hard decisions about where we can accept risk can be made in a more substantive manner.  

And there's a couple of things that the Commission has recommended that will assist with that. One is - is to have an ongoing strategy discussion within the Department of Defense that has periodic and timely updates to strategy, and by timely updates what I mean is that it would be in front of the main efforts to actually develop what today is called the "POM, the Program Objective Memorandum," which is really the services’ submission to OSD for their budget and so the Department of the Air Force has a single POM, that includes both US Air Force and US Space Force and some other Department of the Air Force administrative housekeeping kinds of money in it and in the future has a different term to it.  

So, that's an important part of what they're looking to do is have that continuous strategy development and update that's driven by things like wargames and senior level conversations, so that seniors understand the sort of expectations that would be put forth for when they're developing their budget.  

A second part of that is to understand the budget in a way that you can show that it is related to strategy. So even when we do budgets that are highly-aligned to strategy, it is often difficult to explain that to Congress and to the public in a way that is compelling and so being able to adjust the way that budgets are explained, and displayed, and documented will be an important part of aligning to strategy. 

14:17 - 15:02 

You mentioned the POM - which together with the Budget Estimate Submission make up what the service submits to the Office of the Secretary of Defense - or OSD - for the DOD portion of what ultimately becomes the Presidential Budget. 

Now, the future term you referenced for this step in the process the Commission suggests calling the “Resource Allocation Submission” - or RAS - which would replace the POM and the Budget Estimate Submission by consolidating them into a single RAS document that will streamline the budget submission process.  

So if these changes were to take effect - how would a better alignment between budget and strategy help with adopting innovative space technologies? Particularly with respect to the pace of innovation that we were discussing earlier? 

15:03 - 16:30 

I think there's a number of opportunities there. If you think about, displaying your budget material in terms of an overall capability. 

So let's think about strategic missile warning as an example. Strategic missile warning is done through a combination of satellites on-orbit and large radars on the ground and the people that operate them and the connections between them all coming together to provide that warning of incoming, intercontinental ballistic missiles. Today, the way that the budget is displayed, it would show each of those piece parts as something different from each other and not be done in a holistic manner. 

And because of that, it makes it very difficult to make trades across different programs within a capability set. So now, if I have an innovative capability to - let's just say that I've got some sort of new magic that allows for a much greater fidelity coming from satellites, maybe that means I don't have to have the same sort of capability on the ground or from a different set of satellites. 

So it is difficult to take advantage of that innovation today in a way that allows the most efficient use of budgets in the future and so being able to pull all that together in a more holistic fashion allows the more effective on-ramping of technology.  

16:31 - 16:40 

The second critical area the Commission identified is to: “Foster Innovation and Adaptability.” 

How does the Commission recommend the DOD do this? 

16:41 - 20:23 

This really gets into sort of the Resource Allocation phase, by and large, although some of it is also in the Execution phase. Part of what they recommend is to increase the flexibility primarily in what we call “operations and maintenance funding, O&M,” which is, funds that are only good for a single year. 

So when they're appropriated, ideally on October 1st of 2024. They expire on September 30th of 2025. If they're appropriated on March 1st of 2025, they still expire on September 30th of 2025 and so you only have so much time to be able to expend those funds. And because of that, at the end of the year when you haven't necessarily spent all funds in the manner that you had intended, there is a mad rush to spend money, as quickly as possible and not necessarily in the most effective manner. 

So one of the things that the the Commission recommends is to take a small portion of O&M funding, and they think about 5% to be able to say, “Let's roll that over and make that two-year money or three-year money,” so that you don't have a mad rush to spend every last dollar, even if you're not buying the most important things and I think that that would make better use of the taxpayers' dollars. 

Another thing that they talk about is, during the budget execution, the ability to move money around a little bit easier. There is something called, “Above Threshold and Below Threshold Reprogramming Authorizations.” 

And when something is Below Threshold, it means that the services can move money around and if it's Above a Threshold, then they have to ask for permission from Congress and it goes to the two Appropriations committees and the two Authorization committees, and then sometimes also the intel committees depending on what that money is.  

And they have to get permission from all 4 or 6 committees to move money from one program to another program, or from one color of money to another color of money. And that is not necessarily the most effective way to do business, so if they were to raise the Above Threshold Reprogramming Threshold, then the Department of Defense could move more money around.  

They also point out, though, the need to be able to do that in a way that maintains transparency with the Hill because, frankly, absent that transparency, it is very, very unlikely that the Hill would approve changes that would be significant in that.  

A third is, the limits on Continuing Resolutions. So a Continuing Resolution goes into place almost always on October 1st, just like it has this year and what that means is you can spend on the same things that you spent last year and basically at the same rate that you were spending them. But it doesn't take into account the new things that you want to be able to do and it also doesn't take into account that you want to maybe stop doing some of the things that you were doing in the previous year. 

So we have now moved into a Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year '25 that is spending at the same rate and on the same things that we had in Fiscal Year '24. What it doesn't allow us to do is new things and those are called “new-starts.” Now there's reasons to not want to have new-starts as part of that authority, but it does certainly reduce the flexibility and reduce the timeliness of being able to get new capabilities going. 

20:24 - 20:46 

Thank you, Shawn. And so this leads us to the third critical area, which the Commission defines as “Strengthening Relationships between DOD and Congress.”  

You just mentioned the need for more transparency, especially between DOD and the Hill. So what are the current communication gaps that often exist or sometimes exist between the executive and legislative branches?

20:47 - 22:16 

There is a bright line for discussions between the executive branch and the legislative branch, with respect to budget and the timing of budget decisions. And I think that that tends to lead to a relationship that is not particularly collaborative and I think that that is something that needs to be adjusted, quite frankly. 

I believe that early and more substantive discussions between the Department of Defense and the Hill on the kinds of challenges that are faced, both from a budgetary standpoint, but from a capability standpoint, a threat standpoint, as well as a sense of changes that the Hill should expect to see in future budgets would help with the transparency challenges that are there today. 

So when the Hill receives a budget and they're surprised by what is in it, you're starting an uphill battle. If, on the other hand, we could have some of those conversations early and often, then when a budget's delivered, they would say, “Yes, we expected that you would be making these changes.” It doesn't necessarily mean that they would be accepting of them, but it would mean that they're not surprised by them and I think that that would go a long way toward a more collaborative relationship between the Hill and the executive branch. 

22:17 - 22:49 

And specifically as it pertains to classification - or even over-classification in some cases - this can complicate some of these communication efforts.  

So one recommendation the Commission is putting forward in this critical area - is to establish classified and unclassified communication enclaves.  

How would these enclaves, both in a classified and unclassified sense, help inform our congressional leaders so that there aren't as many surprises when the President's Budget is unveiled every spring? 

22:50 - 24:15 

So in terms of the over-classification. The challenges are a couple. One is, not everyone on the Hill would be clear to the most highly-classified material, whether that is threat material - what our adversary is up to - or, how we intend to address the threat with a set of capabilities that we have and when not everyone is cleared to that information, it gets stovepiped in a way that isn't helpful sometimes and so being able to reduce the level of classification, prudently, will be important in the future. 

The second is that if you want to gain support from your constituency, the taxpayers are the congressman's and the congresswoman's constituents. They need to be able to explain things and so it's got to be simple and they've got to be able to do that at an unclassified level. And so the more that we can talk about our capabilities and the adversary's capabilities in an unclassified way, the easier it will be for the Hill to explain why it's important to their constituents because they can't very well just say ‘Just trust me. We have a problem that we need to deal with.’ 

Because that, frankly, doesn't go a long way. We have a skeptical society and for good reason and so I think being able to explain in clear ways at an unclassified level will be very important. 

24:16 - 24:38 

Now, these communication efforts even extend to the varying roles of Congress and their respective relationships to the DOD. 

For example, different committees in Congress serve the role of “Authorizers,” while others serve the role of “Appropriators.” 

Can you describe why it's important to understand the difference between Authorizers and Appropriators and how they relate to the DOD budget? 

24:39 - 26:26 

Authorizers - the HASC and the SASC -  House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, they're the ones that write the National Defense Authorization Act, which is primarily a policy bill. It has numbers in it to authorize funding.  

But in the end, that authorized funding is not what actually gets put into a budget. So the Authorizers primarily are developing a policy bill that has dollars associated that give a sense of the sorts of money that would likely be available.  

The Appropriators build a budget and it is very light on policy. But they do focus very significantly on the specific dollar amounts by program, by budget line item. They are less concerned about whether or not the Department of Defense has the right requirements, as they are: “Are they making the right use of taxpayers dollars?” 

Because that's their job. They are the appropriators that will appropriate budgets that eventually get spent. And so, their budget development and their oversight role is focused very clearly on that and so that's a very data-centric demand. 

And it is, in the end, the money that's appropriated that matters when it gets to be spent. And there are sometimes different views on, on things between the Authorizers and the Appropriators. And that can create some tension on the Hill, but it can also create some tension in the Defense Department when the Authorizers would say, “I want you to do A at level X,” and the Appropriators say, “Well, I want you to do B at level Y,” because in the end, you can't do A at level X if you don't have money to do that and you have to obey the appropriations law in the end.

26:27 - 26:44 

The fourth critical area evaluated by the Commission is to “Modernize Business Systems and Data Analytics.” 

Can you explain how the DOD currently manages its budgetary data? And how would a single, common platform the Commission is proposing improve decision-making for the DOD budget?

26:45 - 28:11 

I’d start by saying there is no single system that the Department of Defense uses today. 

What the Department of Air Force uses is different than what the Department of Navy uses, which is different than what the Department the Army uses. And, oh, by the way, it's different from what OSD uses, and different from what OMB uses and so you've got multiple databases, and so just the challenge of moving information from one database to another lends itself to mistakes. 

And it lends itself to having funds go into the wrong budget line item and because those mistakes can, frankly, be pretty significant, we spend an awful lot of human time and effort to reduce those mistakes. Well, that's not a very effective use of human beings. We should have humans do what humans are good at, which is making judgments and let machines do what machines are good at, which is transferring data from one database to another database. And even better yet, having a single database that we can all work off. That really only makes sense.  

So I think that there's, some real opportunities there. And I think the data analytics would, both tie capabilities together and understand, “Oh, if I cut something out of a program, A, that will have significant impacts on programs B, C, and D, even though, they may not be tied in your head in the same way that, that they actually are implied.” 

28:12 - 28:25 

Moving to the last critical area, the Commission aims to “Strengthen the Capability of the Resourcing Workforce.” 

Why is it important to strengthen the knowledge base of personnel that are managing the budgetary side of acquiring space technologies?  

28:26 - 29:33 

So I like to use the terms ‘Recruit, retain and refresh.’ Because refresh, indicates that maybe, it's time for changing some people in and out and it also means that they continue to be educated on what's the latest in the greatest.  

In today's world, we have financial management professionals. That is, an AFSC within the Department of the Air Force to be an FM professional. And obviously the civilians do the same things. They are FM professionals and they're certified in the same way that we have acquisition professionals.  

On the other hand, the people that today build the POM may have gone through a few days training, and maybe they have some years of experience, but there's not a certification program for developing a POM for doing that resource allocation piece. 

And so it's something that comes with a lot of experience and there are some classes in it, but there's nothing like the sort of professional piece to it that we have on the comptroller side of it. And so I think that there are certainly some opportunities for more formalized training for those folks that go into that - I think would be significant value added.  

29:34 - 29:55 

Thank you, Shawn. 

Since its release, the DOD announced an Implementation Plan for the Commission’s previously issued “Interim Report,” which came out in August of 2023. 

Now, based on both the Implementation Plan and the DOD’s response to the Final Report - what do these signals suggest about the DOD’s key takeaways from the Commission’s findings? 

29:56 - 31:57 

The reaction of the Department of Defense to the Report has been overwhelmingly positive, and overwhelmingly forward-leaning. 

The Dep. Secretary of Defense, Secretary Hicks, stood up a team to begin implementing as many of those things as were within the Department of Defense's control as they could. That signals that the Department of Defense understands that there are significant limitations to the current system that we have. 

Now, there are many things that are outside the Department of Defense’s ability to implement on its own and will take collaboration with the Hill. And I think that the Department of Defense is very willing to engage in that collaboration and I think that there are portions of the Hill that are looking forward to that, and there are portions of the Hill that are somewhat resistant to that. 

And I understand that resistance. They want to ensure that they can provide the appropriate oversight that's necessary and I think that that's absolutely critical, it's the way that the Constitution drives things. 

So I think it's incumbent on the Department of Defense and the Hill to work together to understand how can that necessary transparency be put in place in a way that then allows some of the other changes that I think everyone agrees the goals for the changes, which is more rapid, and more agile, reaction to both the adversary as well as the opportunities of innovation. 

There is no one on the Hill that says we need to slow down. To a person, it is: “How can we adjust faster?” So the goals - there is great agreement on. How you get to those goals is going to continue to take some work. 

But I think the main signal from the Department of Defense's Implementation Plan is that they take it very, very seriously and that they are more than willing to work with the Hill to implement as many of the recommendations as possible.

31:58 - 32:38 

At the time of this taping - we are in the heat of the 2024 election. And by law, the Presidential Budget - for the upcoming fiscal year - is presented to Congress on the first Monday in February. 

Regardless of election outcome, there will be a new incoming administration, as well as a new Congress. 

So, in order to make sure that the Commission's Final Report and its findings don't fall through the cracks, so to speak, and also considering the quick turnaround time from Inauguration Day in late January, to a Presidential Budget in early February - what key points from the Commission's Final Report should the incoming administration consider as it prepares its next budget? 

32:39 - 34:31 

The first thing I would do is I would commend to the incoming administration - read the Report. The entire report's fairly long, but the executive summary is 20-some odd pages. It is absolutely worth the, you know, half hour or 45 minutes to read the Report and understand the kinds of challenges that are there. 

The second is for the new administration to take a collaborative approach with the Hill, and to try to set that up as quickly as possible, and set up a relationship between the Department of Defense and OMB and the Hill - that is one that looks to collaborate on solving the nation's problems. 

From a practical standpoint, talk to the commissioners, talk to the chair and the vice chair of the Commission about what their findings are and, frankly, behind closed doors say, “Is there more that you would do?” Because my view of the Commission's Report is that, while there are some very, very positive, substantive recommendations. 

I think that they probably would have liked to have recommended more, but they knew that they were unlikely to be received as well. That's what I would commend the incoming administration to do, whichever administration is elected. 

And by definition, as you said, the next administration is going to be a new administration. You're going to have a new Congress. I expect that there'll actually be significant turnover on both the House and the Senate side and so you'll have a number of freshmen members that will be willing to take a fresh approach. 

And this will be a great opportunity to be able to say, “Hey, let's maybe bury the hatchet in some cases. Let's take a fresh approach. Let's take into account the seriousness of the world that we face, and determine as a nation that we are willing to adjust some of the conventions that we've had in the past to address the challenges and take advantage of the opportunities that face us today.”

34:32 - 34:50 

What about the status quo? Despite this unique opportunity with a new President and a new Congress - what if the Commission’s findings are neglected and their recommendations aren’t implemented, or lost in the transition?  

Can you reinforce the imperative for why the Commission’s Final Report needs to be taken seriously? 

34:51 - 35:40 

I will tell you, I think we live in perilous times. And, I commented earlier that, I don't think that China, in many ways, is a pacing challenge. 

I think it's an out-pacing challenge. And I think that the sooner that our nation comes to understand that, and that'll start with a new President reinforcing that. The sooner that that can happen, the sooner it will be easier to put in place the changes necessary to get after that. 

If we fail to take advantage of the innovation that the commercial world brings us and when I say the commercial world - industry in general - we will find ourselves playing second to China, within the next five years. And I don't think that that's a place that our nation wants to be, and it's not a place that the rest of the world wants our nation to be. 

35:41 - 36:04 

It seems to me, the Commission's findings seem to really be pushing for a delicate balance between maintaining the discipline needed for a budget, while also implementing some flexibility to adapt and innovate in the modern era.  

So can you tie these critical areas and these recommendations to that delicate balance between budgetary discipline and flexible adoption for innovative technologies? 

36:05 - 37:26 

I think you hit it spot on, Scott, that this is about that balance between discipline and agility or flexibility. And when you take a look at the 28 recommendations that are there, they generally are about adding agility and adding flexibility, but they do it in a way that doesn't remove the discipline. 

There is great recognition and respect for the role of the legislative branch in this, and that the PBBE Commission was very smart to take that approach. 

It is in the main - their recommendation that we seek a more collaborative relationship between the executive and legislative branches, which would then facilitate the sort of agility and flexibility, because you have a relationship that at least has a modicum of trust that's associated with it.  

There will always be a need for checks and balances and there will always be a need for oversight on the part of Congress. And there will always be a need for the budget to begin and end on the Hill. I mean, they are the ones that are responsible for doing that. But that doesn't mean that there aren't tremendous opportunities for greater collaboration and a greater sense of trust between the executive and the legislative branches and that, in my mind, is really what the Commission's Report is all about.

37:27 - 37:43 

Now, what role can Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy, and its partners such as yourself - not only support the commercial space industry developing these innovative technologies, but also the government partners looking to adopt them and deliver space superiority to the warfighter? 

39:49 - 38:44 

Listen, I was attracted and started working with the Founders of Elara Nova, based on their personal credibility. I've known the Founders for many years, and each of the individuals are fantastic human beings.  

As I got to know Elara Nova better and got to understand the 70-some odd consultants that are part of it. I'm amazed at the breadth and the depth of experience. You've got folks like myself that understand the resource allocation process very well, that understand the relationship between the executive branch and the legislative branch very well. 

You've got other folks that have been, program managers and program executive officers, and leading large acquisition organizations within the Department of Defense. And then you've got folks that are experts at private equity and venture capital, folks that have started their own companies, and all of that has been kind of within the space ecosystem and so when a company wants to work with Elara Nova, they get the benefit of all of that.

38:45 - 39:22 

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security. As a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in space security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. This episode was edited and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge.