Space Force, DOD Initiate New Partnerships to Enhance Mission Readiness

It's been one year since Chief of Space Operations, General B. Chance Saltzman, announced the United States Space Force was creating “Integrated Mission Deltas,” or IMDs, as part of the service's Line of Effort #3 – Partner to Win edict. The new IMD model serves as a primary example of how the Space Force is leveraging partnerships internally to enhance readiness within specific space mission areas.

But the military's newest service is also leveraging partnerships externally, as well. The Space Force is currently assessing its relationship to the various Combatant Commands - including a review of what future space component to United States Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) might look like.

Now, this revitalized emphasis on partnerships is spreading to other elements of the Department of Defense (DOD).  In recognition of the inherently interconnected space and cyber domains, CYBERCOM entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreement with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to streamline the development and adoption of innovative cybersecurity technologies against an ever-evolving near-term threat.

In this episode of "The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security," Maj Gen (Ret) Kim Crider, Founding Partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy, is joined by Lt Gen (Ret) Kevin McLaughlin, Partner at Elara Nova, to explain how the innovative IMD model demonstrates one of the many ways the Space Force – and the DOD writ large – is initiating new partnerships to ensure mission readiness across time horizons to be responsive to the threat.

"The Elara Edge" is hosted by Scott King and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. The full story can be found on Elara Nova's Insights page here. Music for the podcast was produced by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio.

Transcript

Host: Scott King 

Subject Matter Experts: Major General (Retired) Kim Crider, founding partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy (KC)

Lieutenant General (Retired) Kevin McLaughlin, partner at Elara Nova (KM)

00:02 – 02:13 

In the spirit of the United States Space Force’s Line of Effort #3 – Partner to Win, Chief of Space Operations General B. Chance Saltzman announced one year ago that the Space Force was creating “Integrated Mission Deltas,” or IMDs – a new organizational structure designed to coalesce specialized personnel, such as acquisition and operations, together – to collaborate on providing capabilities within a specific space mission area.  

The new IMD model marks just one way the Space Force is organizing itself with strategic partnerships in mind. 

The Space Force is also establishing partnerships across the broader Department of Defense, as it stands up service components to the various Combatant Commands. To this end, the Space Force recently initiated a review of what a future space component to United States Cyber Command - or CYBERCOM - might look like. 

And considering the inherently integrated relationship between the space and cyber domains, CYBERCOM itself is redefining some of its own partnerships, as the Command recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding agreement with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency - or DARPA - to support CYBERCOM’s adoption of cutting-edge cyber technologies. This MOU re-imagines DARPA’s traditional role for a modern age, when the warfighter is increasingly reliant on both cyber and space-based capabilities. 

Welcome to the Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security. I’m your host, Scott King. We have two guests today, here to shed light on how each of these initiatives – both within the Space Force and across the broader DOD – demonstrate the various ways General Saltzman's “Partner to Win” edict is being realized to enhance mission readiness in space security. 

Our first guest is retired Major General Kim Crider, founding partner at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy. As the first Chief Technology and Innovation Officer with the United States Space Force, General Crider has over 35 years of experience managing multibillion-dollar global operations at the cross-section of space and technology. 

General Crider, welcome to the show! 

02:14 – 02:15 

KC: Thank you. Scott.  

02:16 - 02:43 

Also joining us today is retired Lieutenant General Kevin McLaughlin, partner at Elara Nova. 

As the former Deputy Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, General McLaughlin was responsible for defending the DOD’s information networks by providing full-spectrum cyberspace capabilities that facilitate military planning and operations, and when directed, defending U.S. critical infrastructure from cyber attack. 

General McLaughlin, thanks for taking the time to join us today. 

02:44 – 02:48 

KM: I'm really glad to be with both of you. Thanks, Scott. And Kim, I'm looking forward to being with you today, as well. 

02:49 – 03:07 

So let’s go ahead and jump right into the discussion.  

At this time last year, the United States Space Force moved toward creating the first Integrated Mission Deltas, or IMDs.  

General Crider, can you describe what these Integrated Mission Deltas are? And how they're different from the DOD’s traditional organizational structures? 

03:08 - 05:43 

KC: It is a really interesting concept, Scott. There's nothing that exists like the Integrated Mission Deltas. It's very unique to the United States Space Force.  

When the Space Force stood up, it was established to be a very small, lean, mission-focused service. As a mission-focused organization, the Space Force leadership decided that it wanted its warfighting units to be oriented around this concept of a Delta. 

And the Delta is somewhat equivalent to the numbered air forces in the Air Force, meaning that a Delta commander reports directly to the field command, and has a responsibility for ensuring the readiness of the personnel in that organization and the ability of those, combat-ready personnel to be presented to Combatant Command Commanders, in support of missions around the world, predominantly to U.S. Space Command. 

Now, having said that, a Delta Commander therefore has a lot of responsibility and authority, given that there is a rapidly emerging threat in the face of great power competition with very aggressive adversaries who are actively investing in space capabilities, most notably China. 

We talk also about Russia. But both Russia and China are considered regional peer actors when it comes to competition in space, as well as competition in cyber.  

We needed to be able to ensure that these Deltas could actively and rapidly respond to the threat. So an Integrated Mission Delta gives that Commander more breadth of responsibility to be decisive in terms of what their priorities are, to ready their forces and to be responsive to the threat. Integrating space operations, ISR, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and cyber in the Integrated Mission Delta, as well as acquisition responsibilities for the ongoing sustainment of deployed capabilities. 

So having some responsibility within their Delta and squadrons within their Delta that acquire capabilities to continue to improve and enhance and sustain deployed capabilities. Programs that have been operationally accepted into the ops community and now can go through test and training and continuous sustainment and evolution of that operational capability. 

That's what an Integrated Delta - Mission Delta - does. 

05:44 – 06:24 

Thank you, Ma’am. 

So it seems the primary way the Space Force is emphasizing partnerships through the IMD model, is by placing operations personnel – who traditionally prioritize sustaining a capability for the near-term threat – alongside acquisition personnel – who tend to favor developing capabilities for the future, more long-term threat. 

But as you suggested, IMDs go beyond partnering operations and acquisition personnel. So can you elaborate on how IMDs go a step further by incorporating other specialized personnel - like those in cyber and ISR - to ensure mission readiness within a specific space mission area? 

And how can the Space Force learn from this integrated approach?

06:25 – 07:45 

KC: Well, first and foremost, it comes down to enhanced readiness. To know where that threat is, where that threat is going, what that threat is doing - that's where the ISR piece of that comes into play.  

For each mission area to know what the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, personnel within that Delta who are now very steeped in that mission area, whether it be EW or position, navigation and timing. 

Where are the threats? And ensuring those threats are driven back into the operations, the training, and planning this next evolution of that sustained capability.  

And, of course, a big portion of that threat is the cyber threat as well. So how do you defend that cyber terrain that those space systems operate within? 

So creating the Integrated Mission Delta reinforces the ability to enhance readiness across the spectrum. It also enhances the ability to rapidly integrate new innovation, work with acquisition professionals within the Delta to go collaborate with the industry partner that is there, helping them sustain their system to look for new improvements as part of their ongoing evolution and sustainment of their operationalized capability is another way in which the Delta stays ahead of the threat, stays continuously improving itself. 

07:46 – 09:26 

KM: As General Crider mentioned, where it's really innovative and different is it's taking the operational elements of the Space Force, making sure they're integrated across the highly specialized areas of things like cyber and ISR. 

And it's adding acquisition into it, which those communities have worked closely together. But they had a very specific relationship and this is changing that to make them sort of integrated from the beginning, focused on a mission area. 

The Integrated Mission Delta has, I think, the great potential to maybe go another level or two on the integration concept into where now, what's presented to warfighters from the Space Force is actually a much more capable operational unit when it comes to both defending and defeating threats. 

There might be other Department of the Air Force things that you would integrate into an Integrated Mission Delta because the Air Force owns all the base infrastructure that might support a mission. There might be things with coalition partners, because we have lots of infrastructure around the world that doesn't sit on U.S. sovereign soil.  

There are more and more of those that instead of integrating at the end when you’ve run out of your own slits, is you think about building that conceptual culture, task-organized from the beginning. 

And then I think with companies, as well. That's probably the hardest thing to do is figure out how do you bring industry in as a stakeholder versus just sort of a vendor? So that's how I kind of see - is assess what their first order goals and objectives are and then maybe with a hat towards warfighting, what additional things might you expand the concept of an IMD to include other things to integrate in the next maturity levels of an IMD, you could work to them quickly, but in a deliberate way. 

09:27 - 10:45 

KC: I do agree that the first order of assessment is to look at how they're doing today with the current Integrated Mission Deltas that they've put in place, as you mentioned, Scott, these were announced literally a year ago. 

By all accounts, have been very, very successful because they've already started to see some of the benefits that they had hoped an Integrated Mission Delta would drive toward: higher performance, higher readiness levels, the ability to respond more quickly to changing requirements, added flexibility on the part of the Commander. 

We all know that operations and acquisition, there's certainly a desire to work together. But when you're in two completely different stovepipe organizations, you've just got different priorities. So the ability to work together and prioritize things under one leadership chain has already proven to be highly valuable, not to mention the cultural benefits of something like an Integrated Mission Delta where everybody just feels part of the same team, organized around a mission set, creates a huge esprit de corps. 

But to General McLaughlin's point, if an Integrated Mission Delta was really organized fundamentally to drive unity of command and unity of effort, well, that unity often has to involve a lot of other external agencies as well. 

10:46 – 11:13 

For the initial IMD models, the Space Force selected Space Delta 3 - Space Electromagnetic Warfare - or EW - and the Provisional Position, Navigation and Timing - or PNT - Delta.  

Why were these Deltas, and their respective EW and PNT mission areas, well-suited to be the prototype IMDs? And after their first year of implementation, where does the Space Force go from here? 

11:14 – 14:02 

KC: It's been stated by the Space Force that they specifically looked at Delta 3, EW, because the way in which Delta 3 operates, both its defensive and offensive EW capabilities, they are the primary and the single Space Force Delta that deploys with its equipment. 

So in doing so, they already have teams that are maintaining and sustaining capability, built into that organizational construct. They could build upon that, and really reinforce the responsibility of that Commander, not just to be responsible for maintenance and sustainment, but how do we evolve this capability and formalizing that, I think, was an important piece of it. 

One aspect of EW, however, that had not been fully integrated, which really became their testbed for that specific IMD was the integration of ISR and cyber. 

Of course, they had an ISR detachment already connected to the EW folks, but they weren't officially part of that command structure and so bringing that ISR detachment in and making them a very specific squadron underneath, the EW Delta Commander was another important piece of it and then with a defensive cyber ops component as well. So that whole activity now becomes the Integrated Mission Delta.  

Position, navigation and timing, came out of what was Delta 8. Delta 8, when the Space Force was established, was position, navigation and timing and SATCOM. Two very large mission areas, very critical mission areas under one Delta commander.  

So here we saw a real opportunity to pull out the PNT mission area and let it stand on its own. And PNT, as I'm sure General McLaughlin knows, has had a long-time concern relative to cyber threats to our entire GPS enterprise. So having defensive cyber, teams already focused on GPS and PNT capabilities, integrating ISR experts into that area as well, and then looking at how do we start to plan for the future of that whole PNT enterprise and now would have the continuous oversight of that Delta Commander for the ongoing deployment and implementation of that future ground system for PNT, for GPS.  

So that gave that Commander now more oversight over what was going on operationally and what was going on from an acquisition standpoint. And here again, the reports that I have heard really from both these Commanders, Delta 3 and the PNT Delta, is that it's been highly successful and extremely efficient and effective at bringing people together to solve problems faster. 

14:03 – 16:07 

KM: I would just say backing up to what General Crider mentioned, they were very wise in the ones that they picked first. It was important that the first things that they tried were successful and they are being successful. 

But I think the Space Force experts that had lived in these communities, they already knew where some of the problems were. It was organizational barriers and so I think they knew we could solve some of those problems right off the bat by creating a team from the beginning. So I applaud them being wise in what they selected. But if you were going to further mature it, I would keep doing the same thing.  

What are the next level out of key dependencies that are required for mission success, both in how you organize, train and equip and train your people and build new capability, but even more so how you are effective in warfighting?  

And so the EW mission, just think about what the next level might be. It might be a strong tie to the 16th Air Force and they're the component to U.S. Cyber Command. So U.S. Cyber Command, they're used to creating connectivity between their service component elements and the services.  

The U.S. Space Force sort of didn't exist when Cyber Command and the other services started creating their structure. But they're all used to being very, very tightly coupled, and so I think growing into an IMD might be an on-ramp into that for the Space Force. And I'll tell you, I know the EW mission in many cases it’s sensitive and it’s hard. There’s a lot of things we do just U.S.-only. 

But I wouldn't lose sight of the fact that our Allies often had the ability to assist in ways that are beyond the size of their units. And I think, as General Saltzman just brought in Vice Air Marshal Godfrey to be on his staff as an actual exchange officer. 

And so I think the arrival of Godders into the team will help in many mission areas and so that might be another thing to think about is, at what time would it make sense to have some connective tissue between the Delta 3 and maybe some coalition partners or the Combatant Command might have? So I would look in those areas and figure out which ones are the easiest to do well and where you have a willing partner, and then add that into the construct and then learn from it. 

16:08 – 18:24 

KC: I do think that the Space Force intent is to apply this approach across all of the Mission Deltas. They've said that they are moving in that direction. 

They are planning to take the lessons learned, and, you know, integrating it back through. I would say that part of it is not just at the unit level, though. Integrated Mission Delta is proving to be very successful. The prototypes have been successful. They want to expand. 

But in order to be really effective at that expansion, you've got to now go to the next level up and say, ‘Okay, what does the field command do to enhance the Integrated Mission Delta? Space Operations Command is ultimately responsible for readiness of all the Mission Deltas and the presentation of forces to U.S. Space Command.  

So what does the field command need to do? How does the field command need to organize itself? How does the field command need to, perhaps re-think some of its processes to really drive the success of these Integrated Mission Deltas based on the lessons that have been learned? And what about the other field commands?  

I mean, Space Systems Command still has acquisition responsibilities for new programs, for large systems that are being developed that will ultimately be deployed into these Integrated Mission Deltas. 

The Integrated Mission Delta does not do away with Space Systems Command. There's still a tie between these IMD's and now what's called “System Deltas” that are planning the future of next generation capabilities that will ultimately get operationally accepted and deployed and then sort of fall under the sustainment responsibilities of the IMD. How does SSC orient itself around the Integrated Mission Deltas? They've started to do that, but that's going to continue to evolve.  

STARCOM, Training and Readiness Command, will also have to think about with its training deltas, ‘How does it integrate well with the Integrated Mission Deltas, and how does it organize itself?’  

And then finally, Space Force has said it's working to stand up a Space Futures Command that will stand up this calendar year and be responsible for new concepts, concepts and technologies, war-gaming, as well as the Space Warfighting Analysis Center. So how does that new command orient itself? So the orientation of the field commands relative to the Mission Deltas is another piece of driving effectiveness.

18:25 – 19:00 

This brings us to the next aspect of our conversation. The United States Space Force is also initiating partnerships across the DOD’s Combatant Commands, as the service is currently resourcing space components to Space Command, Indo-Pacific Command, and European Command, among others. 

But the Space Force also announced it’s creating a mission analysis team to assess what a space component to U.S. Cyber Command might look like sometime in the future.   

So in light of the interconnected nature of the space and cyber domains, what are some factors the Space Force should consider as it explores a service component to CYBERCOM?

19:01 – 22:43 

KM: Well, as we read in the press, the US Space Force are creating service components at the various Combatant Commands. You know, Cyber Command's on that list. I would also say, while, the Space Force isn't a Combatant Command, it's a service that organizes, trains and equips for global capabilities and it will be interesting to see how the Space Force will actually bring a component to U.S. Cyber Command, because they have components today. Most of those components are focused on delivering warfighting elements in the cyber mission force that they use either to attack or defend in cyber. 

And so I think in this case, the U.S. Space Force has the chance to do the same. And the question would be, we've talked a lot about defensive-related things. So I think augmenting and really maturing the ability to defend cyber-related terrain in the U.S. Space Force will be something the U.S. Cyber Command folks will value and treasure. 

And so, on the operational real-world experience...when I was at U.S. Cyber Command as the Deputy Commander, my last assignment, initially we had, I'd say limited authority over operating and defending DOD networks. There were large parts of what is today called the DOID and the DOD Information Network that we had no responsibility for. We had no authority and no forces, etc. And the operational experience that I have from that, as soon as we had some compromises and like, really bad intrusions from a nation-state actor. 

I'll just say in some defense agencies that we had no responsibility for the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman did not call my Combatant Commander and say, ‘I realize you don't have any responsibility here. I'll work it with them.’ He called the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, Admiral Mike Rogers, and said, ‘What are you doing about it?’ 

And we didn't say, 'We don't have authority to do it.' We went and did something about it, but we immediately started working on what do we do to change authorities and others and that resulted in broad responsibility across the DOID and we created a three-star led component that was dual-had with the DISA director.  

The reason I mentioned that story is that the first time a U.S. Space Force mission capability does not work because of a cyber attack against a non-U.S. Space Force-owned thing. They're going to have to say, ‘Yes, sir. I know we need to get the missile warning capability back up,’ and they're going to be running around and go try to figure all that out. 

And that's what the adversary is going to attack. General Crider and I both serve Chief Chairs, but I serve with her on the Cyber Committee of the Space ISAC - Information Sharing and Analysis Center and they just published something recently that said there's 100 attacks a week against space system critical infrastructure. 

And so our adversaries, if they can take out a capability by going after some poorly-defended element, and they know it's going to bring it down - why attack the element that's heavily defended? So just conceptually, I think there's an operational imperative. But I can tell you if we don't do it, in conflict there will be a time in the future where we’ll wish that we had.  

But on just sort of the things that you could think about adding. I think having the Delta 6 put elements or squadrons in each of the Integrated Mission Deltas is just one example. The ISR would be the same. Each of those elements would then become highly expert on all of the infrastructure - we’ll use missile warning - space-based missile warning infrastructure has.  

If they owned that terrain and they were told that's part of your job, you wouldn't have to spend gazillions of dollars. It would be more about creating the partnerships and then perhaps identifying shortfalls in the skill sets or capabilities of some of those. And over time, they would be the glue that kind of holds the cyber defense side of an enterprise, of a broad mission. But it would require them to be sort of outside just the walls of the Space Force-owned IT and the mission infrastructure that they're defending today.

22:44 – 24:19 

KC: And I want to foot-stomp some of what my good friend, General McLaughlin is saying here. The enemy is not going to come after us where we're the strongest. Hello - Sun Tzu. They read Sun Tzu, too, for obvious reasons. So the enemy's going to come after us where we’re the weakest and where we're not necessarily thinking through all the dependencies. 

And our dependencies on cyber, if we've learned anything in the last 10 or 15 years is that everything's connected to cyber, especially when it comes to space. And space is connected to critical infrastructure. Space hasn't necessarily been designated a critical infrastructure yet. That's still an ongoing topic, but it's certainly connected to critical infrastructure and so there's so much dependency there that has to be considered. 

So when you think about exercises, you think about studies, you think about doing that kind of terrain analysis that really thinks through your dependencies. That kind of threat analysis has to be and continue to be very extensive and very well-exercised, and war-gamed ways to address and cover down on those threats through integrated collaboration.  

Even though we recognize the importance of integrating defensive cyber into our daily activities within an Integrated Mission Delta, we're not necessarily thinking about the broad cyber concerns, and how these things can come at us from second and third order, you know, attack vectors, so it's just a really important mindset to cultivate.  

24:20 - 24:44 

Now, it appears the “Partner to Win” mindset is being realized in other ways outside of the Space Force, as well. U.S. Cyber Command recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency - otherwise known as DARPA.  

General McLaughlin, can you explain DARPA’s traditional role as it pertains to research and development for cyber capabilities? And how does this agreement change that role? 

24:45 - 25:55 

KM: I've worked with DARPA much of my career. Where they’ve positioned themselves officially, and it's just been changing over time is to do, you know, they call it “DARPA hard.” What are the really hard technologies that are beyond the hard things that weren't coming out of service RDT&E accounts? Research, development, testing, and evaluation accounts. 

And so DARPA, officially, kind of lived in that area. But over time, they began to work on things that had applicability in the more near-term. When I was at U.S. Cyber Command, there were a number of advanced research things DARPA was doing, but it wasn't formalized in terms of the structure. 

And so, DARPA, typically was really far out, had very, very talented people from industry doing their rotations through DARPA with folks in the service. But they were some of the brightest minds in whatever the technology might be. We're talking cyber here. 

So that's kind of where they traditionally have lived and I think what we're seeing here is I think we're changing their role a little bit. We have the threats urgent right now and if there's a national resource in the agency to help a near-term end, I think the government and the Department is starting to say, ‘Let's leverage them in a different way.’ 

And I think the DARPA-Cyber Command relationship is one example of how that's happening.  

25:56 – 27:05 

KC: Yeah, if I could just add an observation here. I mean, we started this conversation out today talking about Integrated Mission Deltas and the value of that and the importance of that and how a next step on that journey might be thinking about how do you integrate with others where you have key dependencies to always stay at the forefront of the threat and be highly effective and highly competitive. 

It's the same concept here. When you're thinking about at a Combatant Command level, a much higher echelon level, but still the value, the imperative really of integrated partnerships. So here's U.S. Cyber Command at its level, actively partnering with DARPA. DARPA, wanting to be an active partner to U.S. Cyber Command, recognizing that it has something really important that it can bring forward, with its cutting-edge capabilities and going after those DARPA hard problems that nobody else has got the wherewithal to do. 

And can bring added value in creating that relationship where there's going to be ongoing influence, ongoing integration, ongoing partnering together that really drives that culture in a whole new direction to be much more effective together. 

27:06 – 27:25 

So we’ve been exploring how a recent emphasis on strategic partnerships, both within the Space Force and across the broader DOD, are aiming to enhance mission readiness in the space domain. 

But what about industry partners, particularly those developing space or cyber capabilities? How might these stakeholders contribute to mission readiness? 

27:26 – 29:31 

KM: You ask a very short question, but there's a lot packed into it. And so, now that I work in industry, I see the same thing. But it’s - what's the opportunity for me in this new thing? And so it’s sort of kids chasing soccer balls, everybody runs to the new thing. There might be money, etc. and they should do it. 

That's how they stay very closely attuned to new things like IMD's and new things like DARPA and their role in technology. So where can they play? And we at Elara Nova live in that world and can help with that. 

But, I think we're doing really well on incubating and bringing little companies into the Space Force. So that part I think - it's going well. But where I still don't see it necessarily are areas where industry big, small and medium - they know what they're incentivized to do. They know why they build things the way that they do and it's almost always because it reflects exactly what the government wants them to do. 

And, but we don't ask them very often to participate as a stakeholder, to say, ‘If you wanted to motivate me to build for example, a cyber-secure system from the beginning, I have some ideas.’ Most of them do versus saying, ‘We're just going to tell you what it is in a solicitation. You're just going to need to be compliant with CMMC and compliant with whatever the acquisition director wants to balance her cost, schedule, performance and you do exactly that.’  

In fact, don't do more than that because it might harm your ability to win an award and you're not going to get reimbursed for that investment. So I think thinking about how industry can play as a stakeholder, while still maintaining the legal requirements to compete against their competitors and win and execute contracts is something that the government can do. 

And I think industry would be willing to do it. But I think that's a government lead and I don't see that part happening, yet. But there are some serious discussions in multiple places, not just in the Space Force about how we might bring that insight into the dialogue for things broadly across the Space Force. But in just specifically in some of the areas that we've talked about the last few minutes.

29:32 – 29:59 

KC: Yeah, I agree with you, General McLaughlin, I don’t think we certainly do enough to challenge industry to innovate in cyber and to bring their cyber innovations forward and to say, ‘Look, show us what you can do by creating a cyber-secure system that still meets our performance requirements. It still works within our cost-boundaries and you can still deliver it on time. See what you can do industry.’ 

We just don't even put that out there. 

30:00 – 31:25 

KM: And I do think, if you think about other requirements and let's just say in an airplane acquisition, the safety side of that. Those are not viewed as sort of functional bills. 

They're viewed as mission requirements. The stealthy-ness of something you name it, all of those. Cyber is still kind of viewed as a non-reimbursed bill. I don't know how we can continue to think about the cybersecurity of some new thing is not a mission requirement. But if it were, I think you would see the cost that we're willing to pay - it would be elevated to some degree.  

And it wouldn't need to be double the price - what's double the price is building it in after you form an acquisition five years later. But if you built it in upfront and you said part of the competitive landscape of whether you win or not. You might win a contract because your cybersecurity approach is better than another vendor who has equal capabilities.  

But they're going to have to be some increase of a cost, because these things aren’t free. And so that's being discussed to some degree about how we might fundamentally alter even cost-estimating and the things that go into treating cyber as a mission requirement. 

It's not going to be simple, but I do think, we all know this is a critical gap for us. So I think, done the right way. I think you'll see that and then perhaps industry might actually be competing with themselves to build the best cyber-secure systems from the very beginning. And if they don’t, they don’t win.

31:26 – 31:54 

Now, both of you are partners at Elara Nova: The Space Consultancy. General Crider, you are also one of the founding partners at the firm. 

Elara Nova has a team of consultants with a broad range of experience in both government and industry, and so can provide unique perspectives on how partnerships can enhance mission readiness.  

But how can the firm contribute to these ongoing efforts? Whether that be the future of IMDs or developing solutions at the cross-section of the space and cyber domains?

31:55 - 32:49 

KC: You know, Elara Nova was established to be an interlocutor, to work in the seams. We think about things across a variety of different perspectives because we're a team of leaders and experts that have grown up in different parts of the space community and the communities that space touches and that touch space. 

So we come from these communities, and we can now look at space from all of these different perspectives and because we sort of operate in the seams, all the different ways that you need to bring a different perspective into an Integrated Mission Delta. 

What else does an Integrated Mission Delta need to think about and be connected to? And then thinking about how do you expand and extend that? So that's what Elara Nova does. We work to bring organizations together to solve problems and so thinking about space and cyber, in particular, is a critical, critical focus for us.  

32:50 - 34:30 

KM: Elara Nova does bring a broad range of experts that have lived in those seams and I'd like to, leverage her word of ‘in the seams,’ there's an increasing, focus and realization that some of the reasons that we find it difficult to build, basically acquire, sustain and operate cyber-secure, cyber-resilient systems, even though we're spending a lot more money as a nation on it, is because of risk that live in the seams between groups. 

So everyone is functioning in their area and we use the word stovepipes at times. And everyone in those groups are operating according to the rules and the incentives that they have to do. So everyone's doing what they're supposed to.  

And what we don't do very well is understand in those seams, looking at the actual risk that are either live in the seams between groups or that are passed between groups unknowingly. I'll mention one simple just example. 

If you're going to waive a cybersecurity requirement as an approving official, you need to coordinate with the owner of the mission that those things do. It might be multiple Combatant Commands or something so that they have a voice and the level of risk they think that they are going to be, it's going to be pushed on them. 

That could become a discussion above, because the PMO just has too little money and too much capability they need to field and sustain. So it's not that they're not doing their job correctly, but they don't necessarily think about the risk the same way that the organization that owns it. 

So that’s just one little example of how thinking about bringing insight at the seams that we bring as a company to this. I like that you use the word seams, because I think most of these changes that we could do better are non-material changes.

34:31 – 35:10 

This has been an episode of The Elara Edge: Expert Insights on Space Security. As a global consultancy and professional services firm focused on helping businesses and government agencies maximize the strategic advantages of the space domain, Elara Nova is your source for expertise and guidance in space security. 

If you liked what you heard today, please subscribe to our channel and leave us a rating. Music for this podcast was created by Patrick Watkins of PW Audio. This episode was edited and produced by Regia Multimedia Services. I’m your host, Scott King, and join us next time at the Elara Edge.